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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE

LIFE ASSURS 0 C I ET Y OF THE
lTNITED STATES, a corporation,
Appellee,
EC~UITABLE

AXCE

l

1

~·

I

vs.

' Case No.
ALYIN R. \VALKENHORST and
10849
.T OYCE WALKENHORST, his
wife, RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, \
INC.. a corporation; UTAH INDUSTRIAL COl\lMISSION and UTAH ,1
STATE TAX COl\lMISSION,
Appellants . .I

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE
This is an action to foreclose a real estate note
and mortgage on a family dwelling located in Salt Lake
County, Utah. The mortgagee, engaging primarily in
the life insurance business, coupled with their real estate
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note the collection of joint life insurance payments by
mortgagors who counterclaimed, alleging the mort a;
f h
g l:\t
.
. 1 .
1oan was m
v10 ahon o C apter 27, Utah Code Anno.
tated, "Unfair of Deceptive Acts and Practices."
namely: Title 31-27-2 (1), 14 and 15.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case came on for pretrial before the Honorable Leonard ,V. Elton, who granted mortgagee's motion for summary judgment on its real estate note and
mortgage and dismissed mortgagor's counterclaim. The
court did permit mortgagors to amend their pleadings
to include the defense of usury.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mortgagors, defendants, and appellants seek re·
versal of the judgment of the lower court whereby their
counterclaim, as amended, was dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At pretrial it was stipulated between counsel for
the respective parties, that the promissory note and real
property mortgage which plaintiff, Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States (hereafter
called "Appellee") was seeking to foreclose was executed by Alvin R. Walkenhorst and Joyce 'Valken·
horst, his wife, (hereafter called "Appellants") in the
2

·:·i1mplaint was due and owing by appellants provided
t iia t a ppellec was entitled to foreclose its note and
mortgage.
A ppellee 's real estate mortgage note, mortgage,
atid assignment of policy as collateral security were intr(\duced by its counsel and they were marked as plaintiff"'i Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Appellant introdtll'cd the C niform Real Estate Contract, under which
'he>- originally purchased their home, a Joint Ordinary
L;fc pulicy, a letter dated October 15, 1965, and a letter
dated October 25, 1965; all of these documents were
t:1rn1'ihed the court as part of a Memorandum and
,,·crc marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
\ H. 8:!-107).

Appellants Alvin R. 'Valkenhorst and Joyce
\\'alkenhorst, his wife, on the 18th day of July, 1963,
executed and delivered to appellee their promissory
note and mortgage in the amount of $11,600.00. The
note provided for interest at the rate of 6% per annum
and for 300 successive payments of $108.58, which included interest at the aforesaid rate (P. Ex. 1). As
security for said note, defendants mortgaged (P. Ex.
:! \ a bome in Salt Lake County which they had purchased on the 21st day of March, 1953, for the amount
of $H,OOO.OO. (R. 82-83).
On the 29th day of June, 1963, appellants made
an application to appellee for a joint life policy of
msurance in the amount of $11,600.00, wherein each
apptllant named the other appellant as beneficiary in
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the event of either appellant's death and appelle
.
'
e Would
receive the proceeds of the joint policy to discha rge 1()
note and mortgage. On September l 1963 Eqt ·t 1,·
.
. .
'
•
II a Ju
issued a 1omt policy (See Ex. 2) in the face a11lOUIJ;
of $11,600.00 which provided for a monthly preIUJ· .
•
Ull1
m the amount of $34.34.
Provided appellants paid their note pursuant tn
its terms, towit: 300 payments of $108.58 each, they
would have paid over the twenty-five year period tl;r
total sum of $32,57 4.58. Of the $108.58 payment eacli
month, appellee credited the joint life policy with
$34.34 for a total of $10,300.00.
Appellants' first monthly payment of $108 ..58
pursuant to the terms of the mortgage note was due
September, 1963, and appellants paid it timely; they
followed with monthly payments thereafter for 24 successive months. Thus, appellants made a total of 2~
monthly installments up until the time that appellee
claims the default set forth in its complaint.
Appellants, prior to the time they executed the
note and mortgage and delivered them to appellee,
were told by agents of appellee that the insurance they
were purchasing on their lives would: (a) cost them
nothing, for the dividends the policy would earn would
exceed the premiums over the twenty-fiveyear period of
the note and mortgage; (b) that in the event that appellants, after the first year, should miss a payment on
the promissory note, that appellee would automatically borrow on appellants' joint life policy, and that
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borrowed Ly appellee, appellants could repay
;ti their eo11Yenience, incurring a nominal interest charge;
aiid (c) that appellants could not obtain a home mortg:iµ;e from appellee unless appellants agreed in advance
1u purehase a joint life policy. (R. 76). Appellants
;Tlied upo11 the aforesaid material representations by
:,~ent.'> of appellee.
,tint.~

"\ppellants' default under the terms and conditions
<'I their uote and mortgage, occurred, if at all, on the
-.:wl day nf October, 1965, the thirty-first day after
d<·t'endants failed to remit a monthly payment. In
.1dditiotL appellee claimed there were some unpaid
:wnued taxes and special assessments. However, appellants, but for the filing of this action, were ready,
\Y;llmg and able to satisfy these arrearages.
Appellants, through their attorney, attempted to
remedy any default by remitting two monthly payments, to wit: $218.45 (see Ex. 3) which was refused
on October 29, 1965, unless certain conditions precedent
were met (see Ex. 4, R. 103-106).
Appellee's note and mortgage provides for a thirtyday grace period from the due date of each monthly
installment. Exhibit 2, the joint policy, issued August
:n, 1964, had accumulated a cash or loan value on
October 2, 1965, the date of the alleged default, in the
amount of $150.00 (see page 18 of Exhibit 2, R. 95).
Had appellee kept its promise to appellants to borrow
fron1 the joint life policy, the alleged default by appelia11ts would have been automatically cured.
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On October 27, 1965, appellee refused to accet
a tendered check for the arrearage due, but provisional~
1
would permit appellants to pay their arrearage on th
note. a~d ~ort~age provided they continued keepin~
the Jomt life msurance policy in force; pay specia
assessments, taxes, if any, legal fees, court costs, an:~
further furnish a letter of estoppel for the protectio:i
of appellee. (R. 195, 106).
In fact, had appellee transferred the amount ap
pellants had accumulated under the joint policy, thert
would have been no default at all on the part of apppJ.
lants, for on the 2nd day of October, 1965, defendant·
had a cash or loan value under the joint policy of m
surance of $150.00 (see page 10 of Exhibit 2). The
tender by counsel for defendants on October 15, 1965.
would have been tantamount to payment in advance.
On the 8th day of December, 1966, this matter
came on for pretrial, and the appellee moved the Court
for a summary judgment (R. 49) and for a judgment
dismissing the counterclaim as contained in the answer
of the appellants. Attorney for the appellants prepared
and filed a Memorandum of Authorities pursuant to
leave of Court, and on January 27, 1967, the court
having heard the arguments of counsel as to the proper
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be entered
herein, and over the objection of appellee's attorney,
granted the motion for leave to amend the answer here·
tofore filed to set forth the additional defense of usury
(R. 50).
6

ARGU1\1ENT
POINT I
THE THI.AL COURT ERRED IN GRANTl\l~ ~\PPELLEE'S l\IOTION FOR A SUl\1:\lAHY .JCDG.MENT .
The application of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
1 'i" il Procedure presupposes the following:
1. The party against whom the motion is made
is entitled to all the favorable inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from the facts, a1'd
if when so viewed reasonable men might reach
different conclusions, the motion should be denied, Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm
King Corp., 303 F.2d 425 (6 Cir. 1962).

2. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine
issue regarding material facts must be resolved
against the party moving from summary judgment. Toebleman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line
Co .. 130 F.2d 1016 (3 Cir. 1942).
3. 'Vhere conflicting inferences may be drawn
from the facts presented, summary judgment
may not be granted. Holden v. United States,
186 F.Supp. 76 (D.C.N.Y. 1960).

Appellants set forth in their Memorandum of
Authorities the facts which they alleged they would
proYe at a trial. These facts if established would place
into issue whether or not appellee, in selling its insurance, had made certain prohibited representations, and
further, failed to keep their oral representation in connection with the applications of insurance reserves to be
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applied on loan payments. Appellees would nece,.
sarily have to challenge the foregoing facts and reso\r.
the issues raised in its favor; otherwise, it would foll()\:
that it had breached its own oral contract with apptllants and sought their foreclosure prematurely.

POINT II
IT \\T AS UNLA'VFUL AND IN YI OLA.
TI ON OF THE INSURANCE CODE OF THE
STATE OF UTAH FOR APPEL~EE TO TH.
TOGETHER, AS IT DID, THE REAL ESTATE LOAN PREDICATED UPON APPELLANT'S PURCHASE OF ITS INSURANCE.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Chapter 27, provides

as follows:

"31-27-2. CERTAIN CONTRACTS, UN-

DERSTANDINGS OR COMBINATIONS
FORBIDDEN - ENFORCEMENT OF'
COMMISSIONER'S ORDERS. - (I) No

person shall either within or outside of this state
enter into any contract, understanding, or combination with any other person to do jointly or
severally any act or engage in any practice for
the purpose of
" ( c) establishing or perpetuating any con·
dition in this state detrimental to free compe·
tion in the business of insurance or injurious
to the insuring public.

INDUCEMENTS, UNFAIR
DISCRIMINATION, REBATES PRO·
"31-27-14.
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IIlBlTED. - (1) (a) No insurer or any emplo~·ee thereof, and no agent, broker, or so.licitor
!-.hall pay. allow or give or offer to pay, allow to
1 or, give, directly or indirectly, as an inducement to insurance, or after insurance has been
etfectecl, any rebate, discount, abatement, credit
or reduction of the premium named in a policy
of insurance, or any special favor or advantage
i11 the diYidends or other benefits to accrue there011_ or any valuable consideration or inducement
whateYer, not specified in the policy, except to
the extent provided for in an applicable filing
which is in effect as provided in chapter 18 of
this code.
'"Bl-27-15. OFFERING SECURITIES,
CONTRACTS, GOODS, l\lERCHANDISE
OR SERYICES AS INDUCEl\ilENTS. No insurer, agent, broker, solicitor, or any other
person, shall, as an inducement to the purchase
of an insurance or annuity contract, or in connection with any insurance transaction, provide
in any policy for, or offer, or sell, buy, or offer
or promise to buy or give, or promise, or allow,
in any manner whatsoever:
" ( 2) Any special advisory board contract,
OR OTHER CONTRACT, agreement, or
understanding of any kind, offering, providing for, or promising any profits or special
returns or special dividends, or

" ( 3) Any prizes, goods, wares, or merchandise of an aggregate value in excess of one
dollar, or ... " (Emphasis added).
This court has not had occasion to interpret the
ah<l\·e statutes as they may apply to appellants' theory
of this case, however, the language appears to be clear
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and not amenable to any other interpretation th
an thai
· ·
· .
.
w1uc11 is ordmanly attributed to the language se t fort]
a hove as quoted.
In connection with Section 31-27-1 (c) the off ·
'
er1nlr
of .rea~ estate loans to residents of Utah by appelle~
which is known to be one of the largest insurance com.
panies in the world with insurance in force and mil!ioni
of dollars of assets, is clearly an attempt to establi~n
or perpetuate a condition which is detrimental to fret
competition of insurance in this state, and detrimental
to the insuring public.
31-27-15 (a) expressly prohibits the giving by
appellee of any such special favor or advantage in c011 •
nection with the sale of its insurance.
Appellee's agreement to lend $11,600.00 payable
over a 25-year period at 6% annual interest is clearly
a special favor or advantage or valuable consideration
or inducement to gain insurance business through the
use of its multi-million dollar treasury.
31-27-14 (2) and (3) prohibits an insurer to offer
promises, give or allow in any manner whatsoever, any
OTHER CONTRACT, AGREEMENT OR U~·

DERST ANDING OF ANY KIND PROVIDING
FOR OR PROMISING ANY PROFITS OR
SPECIAL RETURNS. The lending of $11,600.00

to finance defendants' home in connection with the sale
of insurance, as was done in this case is prohibited, and
such contracts are void.
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POINT III
APPELLEE'S INCLUSION OF INSUR.\~CE PHE~IIE~IS IN ITS PROMISSORY
\'UTE EXECCTED AND DELIVERED BY
.\PPELLANTS IN CONNECTION \VITH
THE FINANCING OF THEIR HOME IS UNL\\YFFL.

It is clear that appellee is prohibited from soliciting
i1,,,urance wherein it offers as an inducement a mortgage
it1a11. 1t follows, that as a legal consequence of appellee's
,.,Jllertiug :l4 payments of $34.34 each, it must credit
foi.., amount as advance payments on its mortgage loan,
otherwise, appellee's note and mortgage would be in
,·iolation of Utah usury laws, namely, Section 15-1-2,
wherein it provides that maximum interest for the loan
of money, goods, things in action, shall not exceed 10%
per annum.

Thus, at the time of the alleged default by defendants, they had, in fact, prepaid $824.16 and were
not in default. If the aforesaid payments are not
credited as advance payments on the note and mortgage, then the legal conclusion is that appellee has
embarked upon a usurious contract with appellants and
pursuant to Section 15-1-17, UCA, all interest is forfeited and defendants are entitled to treble such payments as unlawful interest payments, and be awarded
their costs and attorney fees. See National vs. Bayou
Country Club, 16 Utah 2nd 417, and 403 Pac. 2nd 26.
11

POINT IV
ACTS AND CONTRACTS IN VIOLATIOx
OF SECTIONS 31-27-2 (1), 31-27-14 (1) (a) A~L
31-27-15, UCA, ARE PROHIBITED AND REX.
DER SUCH ACTS AND CONTRACTS rorn
AB INITIO.
A ppellee's promissory note and mortgage are \'(\i<l
ab initio for they were executed as part of the insuranct
contract which is void as a matter of law. The note an 1;
mortgage, which were marked and admitted at pretrial,
provide for the payment of insurance premiums a)
well as appellee's money loaned and cannot be sep~1rated.
This court announced long ago in Baker v. Latse.1
60 Utah 38, 206 P. 553:
"It is the generally accepted doctrine of this
country that every contract in violation of law
is void. It is equally true that our courts will
not lend their aid to the enforcement of nor
permit a recovery of coi_npe~sati?n u_nder, contract made and entered mto m v10lation of law
prohibiting them or declaring them to be unlawful."

Appellee has no right to foreclose its mortgage and
note in this matter. In fact, they have no security and
their action should be limited to money had and received
by appellants.

POINT V
THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY 'VAS
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\OT HE(;ISTEHED AND DELIYERED TO
\PPELLAXTS UXTIL AFTER SEPTE:\IBER
I rnn:3. IIEXCE APPELLANTS ARE NOT
BUl.XD BY THE TER~IS OF THEIR \VRITTEX i\SSll;X~lEXT AND EQUITABLE IS
BOI'XU BY THEIR AGENT'S REPRESEN'L\TlONS.
Appellants were required to assign as collateral
Jor tht·tr mortgage loan their joint life policy. See
plaintiff\, Ex. 3 attached hereto and made a part hereof
l:y rei'erern:e. The joint life policy, Exhibit 2, shows on
ih face that it was registered September I, 1963.
:\ ppellants could not assign their policy until
E(1uitable had processed their application and issued
a poliey. The assignment was executed contempora11eonsJy with the note and mortgage.
The representations by appellee's agent that appellee would automatically borrow on the policy in the
event of appellants' missing a payment, is controlling,
notwithstanding appellee's position that the written
assignment controls the rights between the parties for
the following reasons:
( 1)

The assignment is void as a matter of law for
reasons set forth in Point III, and

( 2) Appellants could not assign a policy of insurance not in being.
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CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted there are substantiat

unresolved disputed questions of material facts \ihitii
require a trial. However, on the face of the documenh
presented by appellee, it would appear proper anrl
reasonable for this court to hold as a matter of law that
the note, mortgage, assignment of insurance policy.
and the joint life policy itself are all void and require
appellee to amend its complaint for an action based
upon money had and received.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT W. HUGHES
425 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
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